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Nataša Pivec 
Feminist thought(s) as dirty intellectuality: 
the case of Andrea Dworkin
Zusammenfassung
Feministische Gedanken als schmutzige Intel-
lektualität: der Fall Andrea Dworkin
Das breite Spektrum feministischer Gedan-
ken von der Kunst bis zur Erkenntnistheo-
rie, die sich um Geschlecht und seine vielfäl-
tigen Arrangements in der Gesellschaft dre-
hen, werden als „anders” oder „schmutzig” 
dargestellt, wenn diese sich nicht in vorherr-
schende erkenntnistheoretische Prämissen 
oder künstlerische Standards der hegemonia-
len Männlichkeit einordnen lassen. Das Kon-
zept der Andersheit wird der Wissenden/Pro-
duzentin aufgrund ihres Geschlechtes und ih-
res epistemischen Fokus zugeschrieben, der 
dichotome Rahmungen eines Körper-Geist-
Dualismus, erkenntnistheoretische Traditio-
nen, geschlechtsspezifi sche Berufseinteilun-
gen, Geschlechtsbinarismus und Körpernor-
men konventioneller Weiblichkeit durch-
bricht. Das Leben und Werk der radikalen Fe-
ministin Andrea Dworkin wird in der Analy-
se herangezogen, um die folgende theoreti-
sche Prämisse des Artikels zu bestätigen: Eine 
Frau, die sich als Wissende positioniert, Wis-
sen produziert und als Feministin (selbst)ka-
tegorisiert (wird), wird als eine Bedrohung für 
das System der  Geschlechterordnung, seine 
Strukturen, Diskurse und Praktiken wahrge-
nommen. 
Schlüsselwörter 
Wissen, Feminismus, Anderes, Verkörperung, 
Embodiment, Andrea Dworkin
Summary
The wide spectrum of feminist thoughts, from 
art to epistemology, which are centred around 
gender and its multi-leveled arrangements in 
society is, when not aligned with predomi-
nant epistemic premises or artistic standards 
of hegemonic masculinity, rendered as Other 
or dirty. The concept of Otherness is ascribed 
to the knower/producer on behalf of her sex 
and her epistemic focus, which transgresses 
several dichotomous frameworks of the 
body–mind dualism, epistemological tradi-
tions, gendered categorization of professions, 
gender binarism and body norms of conven-
tional femininity. The life and work of radical 
feminist Andrea Dworkin was analyzed in or-
der to confi rm the theoretical premise of the 
article, namely that when a woman positions 
herself as a knower and produces knowledge, 
(self)categorized as a feminist, she is per-
ceived as a threat to the system of structures, 
discourses and practices of the gender order.
Keywords 
knowledge, feminism, Other, embodiment, 
Andrea Dworkin
1 Introduction
The term “feminist thought” is a broad one which embraces any discourse which em-
ploys feminism as an epistemic principle and is delivered in various types of knowledge 
transfer: unwritten oral tradition, written literary word and academic epistemology. 
Episte mologies, or highly elaborated thoughts, are hence regarded as “Other” or “dirty”, 
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assuming that the epistemic position of feminist knowledge rivals the dominant systems 
of knowledge/power, which renders them as epistemic dirt. 
In order to be able to assign epistemic “Otherness” to knowledge production, three 
conditions must be fulfi lled: (a) a discourse itself is construed as Other; (b) epistemic pro-
ducers are the embodiment of Other; a diverse and mostly overlapping category of indi-
viduals which are being Othered on the grounds of their gender, ethnicity, skin colour, citi-
zenship, class, age, sexuality, ableness and other intersecting social positions; and (c) the 
dominant epistemic perspective for constructing the category of Other is a privileged one.
When discussing feminist thoughts as dirty intellectuality, key signifi ers of the 
Othering process are the knower’s gender and the epistemic focus of and inquiry into 
social reality, its arrangements and relations, embedded within the (characterized or 
self-characterized) feminist perspective. The process of Othering also includes (where a 
feminist knower is concerned) the process of gendering the knower and her knowledge. 
However, the focal point of epistemic devaluation is the inevitable adjunction of the 
(woman’s) body to the knower, an element which is categorically erased from the tradi-
tion of knowledge production and its legitimization/institutionalization.
The reason why Andrea Dworkin was chosen as a proponent of “dirty intellectual-
ity” rather than of Gloria Steinem or Catharine MacKinnon (the faces of second-wave 
feminism) as the basis for this article is that she (unintentionally) personifi es the media 
stereotype of a radical feminist. The stereotypical second-wave radical feminist was 
more or less a vengeful mass media caricature of feminism in which feminists were 
portrayed as hairy, fat and angry lesbians. Ironically (or not), Dworkin embodied of all 
those traits and, as I will be elaborating, her refusal to be a docile body and complaisant 
thinker renders her a corporeal and epistemological threat. 
2 (Non-)objectivity of universal knowledge
Theories are world views or perspectives which provide an understanding of social real-
ity, although their main epistemic premise is the belief in an objective, autonomous and 
bodiless knower whose perspective derives from “nowhere” or a “god’s eye” position 
(Code 2014: 10). This position reifi ed Western, white and male ways of knowing as the 
only reliable epistemic source. Although it was merely one perspective, value-laden 
with hegemonic masculinity, it was encoded as universal, transhistorical and transna-
tional. Hegemonic masculinity as the epistemic norm is an intersection of sex (male), 
gender (masculinity), sexuality (heterosexuality), skin colour (white), ethnicity (Cauca-
sian), religious tradition (Christian), class (middle and upper class), education (higher 
education), language (English), ableness (mental and physical), citizenship, age (middle 
age) and bodiless objectivity. It was concealed as a standard of humanity, generality and 
objectivity in order to reinforce the fantasm of human homogeneity. However, mostly 
it was a guarantee and a warning to Others not to undermine it with their rival ways of 
knowing, however unelaborated they may seem.
Epistemic objectivity as a part of the Cartesian tradition, which was infl uential in 
terms of modern and contemporary production of knowledge, established several coa-
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ligned arguments which were all embedded in a dichotomous pairing of the world view: 
body–mind, impure–pure, female–male, practice–theory, private–public, emotion–rea-
son, particularity–universality, subjectivity–objectivity and experience–knowledge. As 
is evident from this nomenclature, body, impure, female, practice, private, emotion, 
particularity, subjectivity and experience are on the same side, a side which is excluded 
from parameters, standards and norms of pure knowledge. Pure knowledge, a Cartesian 
epistemic ideal, is an abstract thought, unpolluted by other senses (i.e. body, emotion) 
or to be more precise, unpolluted by Others. 
The idea of the Other is a social mechanism which evaluates and cements other 
people, cultures or even ideas from a privileged position or as Michael Pickering 
(2001: 48) puts it, “is a strategy of symbolic expulsion, a mundane exorcistic ritual, used 
to control ambivalence and create boundaries”. The creation of boundaries is dependent 
on the perception that the coherence or stability of the system is under threat, or as Mary 
Douglas identifi ed this disorder, dirt. Dirt, as she defi ned it, is “matter out of place, the 
by-product of systematic ordering and classifi cation of matter, in so far as ordering 
involves rejecting inappropriate elements” (Douglas 1992: 35). As I will demonstrate, 
feminist thoughts are understood as knowledgeably improper or dirty and treated as 
a pollutant in to the epistemic establishment or creative artistry. Ludmila Jordanova 
(1989: 109) defi ned the process of Othering as “the distancing of what is peripheral, 
marginal and incidental from a cultural norm, of illicit danger from safe legitimacy”. 
The universal objectivity of knowledge is a part of a Western cultural imperative of 
normality, because the Other is always mutually complemented with the concept of nor-
mality. Normality implies order, or at least a set of prescribed standards and conventions 
which, in an epistemic context, advise us on how and what to think. 
3 Intellectuality as social marginality
In their book The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowl-
edge (1991), Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann underlined the potential Otherness 
of the male (!) intellectual as a marginal or unoffi cal expert whose expertise is not con-
gruent with the existing epistemic and social order. The intellectual (i.e. knower, episte-
mic agent), as Berger and Luckmann (1991: 143) claim, 
“implies a redefi nition of knowledge vis-à-vis the ‘offi cial’ lore [and] his social marginality expresses his 
lack of theoretical integration within the universe of his society. He appears as the counter-expert in the 
business of defi ning reality. Like the “offi cial” expert, he has a design for society at large. But while the 
former’s design is in tune with the institutional programmes, serving as their theoretical legitimation, 
the intellectual’s exists in an institu tional vacuum, socially objectivated at best in a sub-society of fellow-
intellectuals.”
Up until the 1960s, knowledge was presumptively defi ned as male to the extent that the 
usage of male pronouns was considered as neutral, so it was palpable that the margin-
al intellectual was male. It was not until second-wave feminism that male objectivity 
was revealed as gendered. Berger and Luckmann (1991) demonstrated two options for 
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the marginal intellectual’s survival in wider society. The fi rst is to withdraw into an 
intellectual sub-society, which serves as an emotional haven and the social base for the 
objectivation of the intellectual’s defi nitions of reality, which is fi lled with signifi cant 
fellow-members of the sub-society. The other option is revolution or replacing the cur-
rent social structure with the intellectual’s one (Berger/Luckmann 1991: 145). Yet, the 
revolutionary or counter-defi nitions of reality were, from a historical perspective, fea-
sible only to the revolutionists of mutable hegemonic masculinity with a social redesign, 
which was another variation of unchanged gender order at its core.
The conception of marginal intellectual developed from a gender-privileged episte-
mic position. Marginality, by Lorraine Code’s defi nition (2014: 15), 
“includes being left out as known or knowable, side-lined as a putative knower; being diminished or 
damaged by/in bodies of knowledge, being denied credibility in testimonial and other epistemic proc-
esses and practices; being discredited within a certain hegemonic formula or set of directives for what 
counts as bona fi de knowledge.”
Being placed in Other positions rather than in hegemonic masculinity translates into 
being on the margins of the social order in terms of norms, practices, discourses, struc-
tures and institutions. However, these different dimensions of marginality are not isolat-
ed, they overlap and lead to the silencing, ignoring or discrediting of certain voices and 
points of view – a woman producer of feminist knowledge in this case.
4 Feminism as Other(ed) knowledge
Dominant knowledge was until the 1960s constructed as gender neutral and second- 
wave feminism’s research, theory and politics has peeled away its objective surface. 
Mary O’Brien (1980 found in Miller/Brewer 2003: 113) dubbed the mainstream 
 epistemology “malestream knowledge” where the supremacy of objectivity labels any 
Other methods of cognitive acquisition inadequate. Second-wave feminists started to 
repudiate the objectivity and universality of male experiences, masked as knowledge 
and focused on women’s lives, experiences, oppression, devaluation and the erasure 
of the feminine knowledges as well as the notion that women are not capable of being 
knowledge producers. Firstly, they revealed that knowledge is partial, perspectival and 
situated in the knower’s social positions and, mostly, that it is an institutionalized ex-
perience. According to the dominant epistemic conception, however, knowledge should 
transcend experience, which is deep-seated in social positionalities and personal em-
bodiment and considered a second-class cognitive source with no or less authority. Ex-
perience is polluted because of its inclusiveness; everybody has access to experience, 
but only members of a select and privileged epistemic group have the exclusive power 
to produce, reproduce and distribute their experiences as universal knowledge. 
Feminism, on the other hand, had certain agendas and placed its emphasis on 
women’s experiences, lives and oppressions. However, historically speaking, feminism 
is a branched theory and practice which cannot be consensual about women’s oppres-
sion or emancipation on the global level. A brief look at the history of feminism reveals, 
for example, that second-wave feminism was engrossed in the structural and  material 
3_Gender3-15_SP_Pivec_031_043.indd   34 21.09.2015   14:34:24
Feminist thought(s) as dirty intellectuality  35
GENDER 3 | 2015
factors for understanding women’s oppression, whereas post-1980s feminism was more 
preoccupied with symbolic and representational issues. The dispositions of several 
fem inist perspectives differed in their objectives and strategies for women’s emancipa-
tion. Liberal feminism focused on equal rights and opportunities, based on the notion 
that women and men are the same, while radical feminism concentrated on women’s 
rights and on dismantling the hetero-patriarchy. Materialist and socialist feminism were 
 oriented to issues of gender and the class oppression of women within structural and 
cap italist aspects of social organization, while the objective of postmodern feminism is 
to deconstruct metanarratives as well as the category of gender and women. Post-colo-
nial feminism, as well as black feminism, focuses on ethnic differences, racialization, 
colonialism and racism in feminist theory (Abbott/Wallace/Tyler 2005: 31–47). 
Feminism can be regarded as epistemic dirt for at least two reasons: (a) the subject 
and epistemic agent are mostly women, and (b) experience is credited as a valuable cog-
nitive source which leads to certain criteria of epistemic purity (i.e. objectivity, abstrac -
tion, man’s reason) not being met. Feminist epistemology, which is considered as improp-
er, is thus still being marginalized within mainstream epistemologies. The knowl edge 
of Others is characterized as experiential or subjugated knowledge, as Michel Foucault 
(1980: 82) defi nes it, “a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualifi ed as inade-
quate to their tasks or insuffi cently elaborated: naive knowledges, located low down 
on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientifi city”. Subjugated 
knowledges are able to oppose and struggle against unitary, scientifi c and formal dis-
courses. There are various experiences of the real, yet their credibility and legitimacy is 
dependent on the amount of symbolic power. 
Women’s experience, which is constructed as subjective, and men’s, which is 
constructed as objective, that is an experience which is informed by theory (Code 
1991: 245), lacks symbolic power in public participation; women’s knowledge is prone 
to a more (sometimes even benevolent or unconsciously driven) epistemic suspicion. 
4.1 Embodied knowledge
Before the ascension of second-wave feminist epistemologies, the traditional epistemic 
agent was not only an objective male, he was also a bodiless entity. Woman, on the 
other hand, was constructed as a subjective Other which lacked cognitive objectivity 
and an embodied Other. The correlation between woman and body is a continuation of 
the Cartesian mind–body dualism and its classifi cation of dichotomous pairings. The 
opposition between mind and body rendered the latter an unstable object in need of 
being manipulated, handled and disciplined (Howson 2004: 7). Body, as the bearer of 
fl esh, emotionality and sexuality, connotes boundlessness, a state of being with unstable 
or fl exible boundaries. Grosz (1994: 203) defi nes the woman’s body as leaky and lack-
ing in bodily self-containment on account of her multiple bodily orifi ces, which is why 
bodily fl uids and secretions operate as a symbolic indicator of uncontrolled seepage. 
Leakiness of the body could be translated into the assumption that the body controls the 
woman and diminishes her mind or ratio. Because the woman’s body is not sealed-up 
and impermeable, it is described, evaluated and standardized as dirty, a conspicuous trait 
in which something or somebody is threatening the order. 
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The perceptibility of the knower’s body is epistemologically signifi cant, because it 
leads to the acknowledgement that the knower is no longer an illusion of a self-con tained 
and autonomous agent, but is situated in a web of (de)privilege and (non)power in a 
physical-social reality, which relies on the intersection of the knower’s social positions. 
Situatedness generally infl uences the production, evaluation, circulation and credibility 
of knowledge and the knower. Ways of withholding the epistemic acknowledge ment of 
feminist knowers are systematically encouraged by means of the epistemic standard, 
the evaluative description of feminist knowledge as the rival or Other and the construc-
tion of women knowers as corporeal agents with an ever-threatening irrationality and 
cognitive incapacity. Epistemic oppression of Othered knowledges is manifested not 
just on account of the systematic withholding of such acknowledgement, but by means 
of more subtle strategies which are appropriate to postmodern Western societies, that is 
representational violence.  
5 A mechanism for handling Otherness: representational 
violence
Claude Lévi-Strauss (1955 found in Bauman 2000: 101) introduced two strategies for 
coping with the Otherness of others, one anthropoemic and one anthropophagic. The 
fi rst strategy was referred to as “vomiting”. It manifests as prohibiting physical contact, 
dialogue, social intercourse, commercial trade etc., which in its extreme version means 
annihilation of the Others (incarceration, deportation, murder). The second strategy is 
called “ingesting”. Here, the Other/they are no longer distinguishable from us (cannibal-
ism, cultural assimilation), which means that their Otherness is annihilated. 
A contemporary variation of ingesting in postmodern Western societies, as a means 
of handling Otherness, is representational violence. As is apparent from the term itself, 
this is a type of violence or aggression which employs representations of certain groups, 
individuals or ideas in their stereotypical, selective and reductionist manner. The dom-
inant discourses used to represent what is considered as the Other can arbitrarily mo-
nopolize the understanding of particular realities, especially when their meaning is not 
complicit with the existing order of hegemonic masculinity.
When discussing representational violence, the prime role of the producer and 
 distributer is to occupy the mass media, which perpetuate societal standards of what is 
normal(ized) and what is not. The power of the mass media to selectively portray Others 
mostly lies in the invisible opportunity to engage in these actions via dis cursive choices 
of topic, language, style, sources, genre and meanings pinned to certain  images (e.g. fem-
inism = angry writings, knowledge = male, women = fat body). By using this approach, 
only select cultural patterns are regarded as normal, natural and common sensical, so new 
meanings of phenomena, individuals, social groups or ideas are shaped by this  standard 
of normality. This is the central advantage of representational violence, namely homog-
enizing what is diverse, disregarding potential complexities of identities and ideas, 
normalizing it to standards of dominant social order and negatively  portraying those 
who differ from the majority’s perceptions and conceptions of  normality. Representa-
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tional violence is a narrower and more visible type of symbolic violence, a subtle and 
almost invisible violence which is produced and reproduced via symbolic  channels of 
communication and cognition (a language, a lifestyle and distinctive proper ty;  Bourdieu 
2001: 2), imposed by dominant groups and compliantly accepted by the oppressed ones. 
Their compliance renders the social order normal and even benefi cial to them.
6 Andrea Dworkin – the Other: a writer, an angry feminist, 
a fat woman 
Thus far, I have tried to show how Otherness is a multifaceted feature (descriptive, eval-
uative and normative) as the result of the intersecting identity locations, which cross-
fertilize each other. I have chosen Andrea Dworkin as a case study in order to demon-
strate those intersecting Otherings.
Andrea Dworkin (1946–2005) was an American writer, an angry feminist and a 
fat woman. Yet, the malestream understanding of her does not necessarily follow that 
order, nor are the adjectives (feminist, angry, fat) used to signify her employed as discur-
sively deconstructive or empowering language. Applying Lévi-Strauss’s strategies for 
handling the Other to Andrea Dworkin would mean the “vomiting” – the “malestream” 
disdain of her work. 
At the beginning of her book Heartbreak (2002: viii) Dworkin placed a quote by 
the French poet Rimbaud – “Je est un autre” (I is Another) – which simply summarizes 
her position of being Other. 
To explain Dworkin’s Otherness, I will begin with her thoughts on being a woman 
writer, a profession which transgresses the gender–work binaries which are ideally com-
prised of man’s incorporeal creation and woman’s corporeal nurture. In her book Inter-
course (2006: xxxi), Dworkin writes that 
“[m]en often react to women’s words – speaking and writing – as if they were acts of violence; some-
times men react to women’s words with violence. So we lower our voices. Women whisper. Women 
apologize. Women shut up. Women trivialize what we know. Women shrink. Women pull back.”
In this short paragraph, Dworkin highlights the essence of a woman’s subordination 
(muteness, silencing and voicelessness) which spreads across every level of socie-
ty. Previously she had highlighted the position of the woman writer in Heartbreak 
(2002: xi): “A woman writer makes herself conspicuous by publishing, not by writing 
[because] the public domain in which the published work lives has been considered 
the male domain”. The most unwelcoming in the realm of knowledge is therefore a 
woman’s public voice or acknowledged knowledge which is even more troublesome if 
it deviates from the masculine norms of what women’s writing should be about, a devia-
tion from what in Intercourse (2006: xi) she calls “the quintessential feminine pose – to 
be liked above all”.
The gendered prejudice about the mere existence of women writers is elaborated in 
the following paragraph taken from Heartbreak (2002: xi):
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“A published woman’s reputation, if she is alive, will depend on many small conformities – in her writ-
ing but especially in her life. Does she practice the expression of gendering a good way, which is to say, 
does she convince, in her person, that she is female down to the very marrow of her bones?” 
When I refer to Dworkin as an epistemic agent, her main source is the subjugated knowl-
edge or women’s experiences and alternative readings of classic (mostly literary) works 
via her own appropriation of critical discursive analysis (CDA). By this she exposes 
subject matters (e.g. rape, pornography, prostitution, sexuality, subjugation of women, 
feminization of poverty) which are otherwise considered to be unfi t, underdeveloped 
or improper for masculine conceptions about what an author should write about. Code 
(1991: 177) writes: 
“The content of ordinary and institutionalized knowledge about ‘women’s nature’ are media represen-
tations about women’s activities, medical judgments about women’s health, educational claims about 
women’s intelligence, historical analysis of women’s experiences, philosophical conceptions about fe-
male subjectivity, psychological prescriptions for normal womanhood … folklore, stereotypes, ideology 
and prejudice. Anyone can be expert about women except women themselves.”
Dworkin, a radical feminist, was the self-proclaimed empathic voice of women and for 
women, not as an expert, but as a medium. In her Letters from a War Zone (1993: 5) 
she writes
“I believe that women must wage a war against silence: against socially coerced silence; against polit-
ically preordained silence; against economically choreographed silence; against the silence created by 
the pain and despair of sexual abuse and second-class status”. 
Her overt denial of the masculine ideal of objectivity is clearly represented in the follow-
ing paragraph taken from her book Woman Hating (1974: 24): 
“This book … is not cerebral wisdom, or academic horseshit, or ideas carved in granite or destined for 
immortality … Academics lock books in a tangled web of mindfuck and abstraction. The notion is that 
there are ideas, then art, then somewhere else, unrelated, life.” 
Her experience of reality as a woman is the key feature of Dworkin’s work because 
she does not separate herself from her work or vice versa. In Letters from a War Zone 
(1993: 5), she writes: “I wrote to communicate and to survive: as a writer and as a 
woman; for me, the two are one. I wrote about them because I care about fairness and 
justice for women”. She goes on (1993: 4): 
“Being a writer isn’t easy or even very civilized. It is not a bourgeois indulgence. It is not a natural out-
come of good manners mixed with intelligence and fi ltered through language. It is primitive and it is 
passionate. Writers get underneath the agreed-on amenities, the lies a society depends onto maintain 
the status quo, by becoming ruthless, pursuing the truth in the face of intimidation, not by being 
compliant or solicitous. No society likes it and no society says thank you. The society will mobilize to 
destroy the writer who opposes or threatens its favorite cruelties: in this case, the dominance of men 
over women.”
Dworkin also highlighted the gendered aspect of writing in one simple sentence in Let-
ters from a War Zone (1993: 31), “She is not a male writer, which means that she cleans 
her own toilet and does her own laundry”. A male writer is often constructed as a “de-
tached genius”, who needs someone to take care of mundane everyday errands. But a 
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woman writer cannot (or need not) escape mundane reality because she is already so-
cietally circumscribed by the domestic sphere and dirt. In her book Right-Wing Women 
(1983: 195), Dworkin also very directly explains why men hate feminism: “because 
women are hated … and [feminism] is the liberation movement of women”. And this 
is one of the characteristics of Dworkin’s writing as Ariel Levy emphasized in the fore-
word to Intercourse (2006: xx): she is ferocious, intellectually confi dent, her writing 
style is not solicitous and she refuses to be docile – literarily, politically, corporeally or 
epistemologically. Dworkin does not embellish or polish her views on feminism, she 
unapologetically advocates it. 
But Dworkin also speaks semiotically. On the cover of Letters from a War Zone 
(1993), her body language (pose, outfi t, appearance) glorifi es radical feminism – her 
hair is natural, she is wearing overalls, she is fat, the photograph was taken outside, she 
is standing, her pose and body occupy the space around her and there is a half-smile, 
almost a smirk on her face. This visual representation is everything radical feminists 
could aspire to. Her refusal to exude any kind of docility is evident in her dismissal of 
bodily self-discipline. Dworkin never positions herself as a Body by occupying a corpo-
real standpoint (e.g. she never discusses her weight), so her fatness is her unconscious 
transgression of bodily norms and another means of occupying more (material) space.  
The feminist discourse of fatness can be translated into the rejection of the dominant 
paradigm comprising biomedical and androcentric discourses, which pathologises and 
therefore strives to “repair” women’s fat bodies. Being fat is a corporeal manifestation 
of occupying the physical space and trangressing the limits of the body – being undis-
ciplined and unbound. 
In contemporary Western societies women’s bodies are disciplined into what Kim 
Chernin (1981 found in Bordo 2003: 141) has defi ned as and what is now widely known 
as “tyranny of slenderness” which can be interpreted as a material and symbolic reduc-
tion of women’s space. The idea of female slenderness is not just a gendered issue, but 
is interconnected with skin colour, ethnicity, socio-economic class, sexual orientation 
and sexual identity. It is a white, heterosexual, middle-class and cisgendered standard, 
and Dworkin, by meeting all of these criteria, represents a transgression of these norms 
by being fat.
Fatness is associated with carelessness, overindulgence and pleasure, which is 
why the fat body is established as unbounded and hence corporeally transgressive and 
in need of being regulated and punished, because it is reminiscent of the culturally 
buried notion of embodiment as being fl uid. A fat body is evidence that boundaries 
(although corporeal) are more fl exible than we would like to imagine. This material 
instability attacks the Western binary logic – dichotomies of inside/outside, mind/body, 
male/female, self/Other, knowledge/experience, homosexual/heterosexual, black/white. 
Fat, gendered as female, is, as excessive corporeality, also excessively female (Braziel 
2001: 239). Fat women are therefore “too much women”, but fatness is also potentially 
queer because fat people do not fall into normative gender defi nitions of masculine 
strength or feminine grace (Sykes 2011: 95). 
As already mentioned, fatness is also a socio-economic category. A fat body de-
fi es the fundamental core of capitalistic economies: effi ciency, productivity, hard work 
and self-discipline. It is a signifi er (and living proof) of laziness, lack of self-restraint 
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and self-containment. Fat is a capitulation to (consumerist) desire over (capitalist) self-
denial (Bordo 2003: 201). But when woman’s fatness is explored from the perspec-
tive of the division of domestic labour (woman = carer, man = breadwinner), where 
 women are nourishers of others fi rst and themselves later or not at all (i.e. preparing 
food, serv ing and cleaning after others), then being fat can be understood as woman’s 
act of selfi sh ness and right to exercise her pleasure. Being a fat woman means that 
the woman  nourishes herself and that her desires and needs (for food) come fi rst. The 
correlation between food and sensuality was established in the Victorian era, on ac-
count of the increasing absence of women eating in public or voraciously (Bordo 2003: 
110). Voracious eating is constructed as a male pleasure so woman’s fatness is a queer 
or transgressive result of otherwise male activity which enables pleasure. If insatiable 
eating in public is still a taboo for women, then fatness can serve as a public reminder 
that when eating happens, it is only performed in the private sphere, away from the male 
gaze. Prohibiting woman’s indulgence of food also represents a ban on woman’s enjoy-
ment of life, given that food is a primary source for physical survival. Female hunger 
is a metaphor for unleashed female power and desire (Bordo 2003: 116), a striving for 
public recognition, independence and sexual agency, because a woman who is eating 
has to be taken seriously – she can devour anything or anyone, just as a man can. As a 
feminist thinker and a fat woman, Dworkin is a symbol of a man-eater, a devourer of her 
object, namely the patriarchy. 
The way Dworkin dressed was another palpable rejection of the traditional femi-
ninity; her overalls became her sartorial and political trademark. In his book Fashion 
as Communication (2005), Malcolm Barnard investigated how fashion produces, repro-
duces and revolutionizes gender (among other identity indicators) by (de)classifying 
the body into the binarism of femininity and masculinity. Clothes are nonverbal com-
munication which reaffi rms or repudiates the culturally imposed and arbitrary relation 
between gender and fashion. The historical correlation between fashion and feminini-
ty arose in the late 19th century when global socio-economic changes were occurring 
(e.g. capitalism, industrialization, urbanization, the formation of the middle class, the 
public/private divide), accompanied with a new moral order of masculine values (func-
tionality, rationality, civility) which prohibited men from wearing extravagant clothes 
(Tseëlon 1995: 23). Women’s (or wives’) clothing became a visual emblem of men’s 
(or  husbands’) social status. Fashion and other ornamentation made the woman’s body 
culturally visible and immediately categorized women as feminine or non-feminine 
woman hood. 
Dworkin primarily wore overalls, clothing which signifi es her overt rejection of 
emphasized sartorial femininity comprising feminine items (e.g. make-up, dresses, high 
heels, stockings, fur, feathers etc.) and the social meanings attached to them. Those 
meanings inherently constituted a woman as an object of beauty, who cares for and 
nurturs a family, a silent observer and sexual prey without agency. It is important to bear 
in mind the historical context in order to be able to understand Dworkin’s (deliberate or 
not) “anti-fashion” decision. Second-wave radical feminism, of which Dworkin was a 
proponent, claimed that fashion reproduces falsifi ed and limited femininity, from which 
it is necessary to escape; one of the methods of disengagement is to refuse feminine at-
tire (Barnard 2005: 185). Fashion was, in radical feminism’s opinion, a reproduction of 
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the ideology of women’s domesticity and by “stepping out” of the fashion system it was 
possible to renounce gender. Such acts of “stepping out” mostly consisted of feminists’ 
rejection of feminine clothes by replacing them with more androgynous or masculine 
attire. But it was not just a rejection of material clothing, it was also the refusal to be ob-
jectifi ed by the male gaze, something which was immortalized by John Berger’s obser-
vation that “men act and women appear” (1972 found in Barnard 2005: 183). Dworkin’s 
overalls, as a political symbol and androgynous attire, therefore function as an attempt 
to act instead of just appear. 
The last non-comforming trait which culminated in Dworkin’s unwillingness to be 
docile is her blunt or angry writing. Anger is a gendered, racialized and classist emotion. I 
will here focus only on the aspect of gender. There are disparate notions of women’s anger: 
The ideology of hegemonic masculinity defi nes women’s anger as irrational and irrele-
vant; the feminist standpoint considers it a logical choice, an emotion which is manifest by 
the oppressed or less powerful groups because of the unequal distribution of power (Šadl 
1999: 196). Women’s anger has the potencial to disrupt the emotional order of  obedience 
and authority, so any deviation from conventions and expectations of appropriate emotion-
al behaviour represents disobedience or resistance. Through differ ent ideological regis-
ters, such as Catholic morality, medical advice and social etiquette, women’s anger has 
been sistematically regulated and disciplined (Šadl 1999: 115). And if anger is regul ated 
in order to preserve the existing social order, then anger has a polit ical connotation. An 
angry woman who breaks regulative norms of emotional etiquette can be labelled as an 
emotional transgressor or, if she fails to perform the heuristic rules of emotional conduct, 
as socially inept (Averill 1986: 110). Regardless of the motive for such maladjustment to 
the emotional order, the outcome is the same: women’s anger is not socially welcome.
When anger is verbalized in critical thinking, unaligned with dominating  paradigms 
about knowledge and gender order, it automatically positions itself as a political  threat. 
As Levy wrote in the foreword to the new edition of Dworkin’s book Intercourse 
(2006: xx): “She was the horror of women’s lib personifi ed, the angriest woman in 
America”. 
To conclude this analysis of Andrea Dworkin: She was the embodiment of Other-
ness in several intersecting categories, namely gender (woman), work (thinker/writer), 
content of writing (feminist), writing style (blunt/angry), appearance (undecorated/un-
feminine) and body (fat).
7 Conclusion
The narrative of proper or normal ways of knowing have to be employed to defi ne 
any knowledge (academic or creative) as dirty or Other. Facts, positioned as truths by 
power ful and privileged people or social groups, are assumed to be more credible, val id, 
trustworhty because they are the continous result of historically institutionalized nor-
mality or common sense. A feminist female knowledge claimant, as the source who 
challenges the established epistemic hegemony, is a political fi gure who is pushed into 
the underclass epistemic status because of prejudices against her sex which is bound 
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up with the prevalent understanding of women (i.e. cognitive incapacity, experience, 
irrationality) and is denied the epistemic credence of her male peers. But this underclass 
status and minor epistemic credence is not overtly displayed, it is enmeshed with the in-
visible web of symbolic violence, but more detectable as a representational violence – a 
selective media presentation of Others which has the tendency and capability to arrange 
itself to fi t the belief systems of the powerful. 
The case study of Andrea Dworkin, writer, radical feminist and fat woman, has re-
vealed that Otherness is also the cumulative identity dimension which distributes itself 
across every cultural level which is infl icted with dichotomous binarism, denied any 
transgression and hence construed as dirt. The transgression of binaries was illustrated 
by means of her choice of profession (writer as a male occupation), political views 
(feminism), writing style (blunt/angry), but most of all by her refusal to engage in con-
ventional femininity (i.e. make-up, feminine attire, dieting). The media’s emphasis on 
Dworkin’s unadorned and fat body is confi rmation of cultural dispositions of congenital 
reciprocity between woman’s body and her as the epistemic agent. Woman as a knower 
cannot escape the confi nements of her body.
Although violence against feminist knowledge has been labelled as Othering and 
rep resentational in this article, current attacks against feminist thinkers1, mostly in the 
social media, are fl ooded with anonymously conveyed direct threats against the knower’s 
dignity, intellectual capacities and physical integrity (e.g. death and rape  threats). Rape 
and death threats are another reaffi rmation of the aforementioned reduction of the fe-
male knower to the level of merely a generic body which can be violated. Social media 
guarantee users anonymity, and if the main feature of the web’s namelessness is clearly 
expressed violence against outspoken and feminist women, then feminism still repre-
sents an intrusive force on or dirt in the gender order. 
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